Journalism as a crusade.

It is a widely acknowledged fact that Journalism today is being suffocated although there is a lot of debate as to what degree this suffocation is occurring. To answer the question as to whether Journalism should be a trade or a crusade it is essential for us to answer some other questions. What was the motive and reason Journalism was started for in the first place? In time what sort of role has it come to play in our way of life? What are the consequences to our way of life if it ceases to serve the function it was set out to in the first place? Today it seems like a dangerous change in the ethics of Journalism is easily gaining acceptance. Editors seem to think it is completely ethical and acceptable to give readers what they want rather than informing them of what they need to be aware off. Hallin (1996, p. 254) in his chapter ‘Commercialism and professionalism in the American news media’ discusses extensively whether this attitude would lead to an age of multiple voices and thereby more democracy or a decline of public life. Hallin (1996, p. 247) makes a study of these recent changes explaining them through two different schools of thought, the readership theory and the stockholder theory. The readership theory quite benevolently claims that given the decline in newspaper readership the Journalists must give the ‘customers’ what they want, at least to integrate social interest into the public once again, if nothing else. The stockholders theory states that with the present norm of selling stocks and ‘public’ ownership, Journalism should be treated like any other business. This change in ethics has devastating effects on Journalism and thereby its purpose in society as Belsey and Chadwick (1998, p. 10) in their chapter ‘Ethics and politics of the media’ point out that “‘Do not lie’ is not equivalent to ‘Tell the truth’. Lying as everyone knows from daily-life situations, can be avoided by silence, vagueness or changing the subject, which suggests that not lying is an insufficient ethical principle, in both daily life and Journalism. A newspaper might just keep quiet about facts which could produce embarrassment for a cause it supports.”

Therefore coming to the above questions there is very little debate that Journalism was set up to enable democracy. Journalism is commonly referred to as the fourth estate of democracy equating it to as much a part of the democratic process as the Executive, the Judiciary, or the Legislative. The function it serves is that of a watchdog. Frost (2000, p. 24) points out that the most important role of the media is to facilitate political discussion and to keep the public informed, as a democratic society that votes needs to be well informed. Frost explains that in most of the western world people are too lazy, busy, cynical and preoccupied for political debate but that should not be a reason not to continue to strive for the ideal and this can only be facilitated by the press. Frost (2000, p. 27) concludes that “when we talk about a free media we are not necessarily talking about the media’s right to publish anything they like, but that people, including journalists, should have the right to spread information and ideas which can be justified morally in order to support the public’s right to know. In other words, information published in the public interest, not merely information to sate the public’s curiosity or desire to be entertained. This means that any pressure brought to bear on a person and his or her right to hold and disseminate ideas and information (whether from government agencies, proprietors, threats or bribes from outside agencies, including advertisers’ pressure) damages the citizen’s ability to have access to as wide a range of views on a subject as he or she desires.” Unfortunately these ideals have been heavily compromised on various levels for example when it comes to hiring journalists it is the organization that does so. Shoemaker and Reese (1996, p. 264) found that while some employers preferred individuals with Journalism majors, other employers preferred majors in liberal arts and more specifically in American studies. They also observed that in the present system, the role journalists see themselves in, had a major impact on the content they produce. If they see their role as disseminating information or adversaries to the powerful it will express itself in the content they produce. Therefore if this role is determined by the owners and the organisation, then it is the owners and the organisation that has a large influence on the content. Another fundamental aspect that conflicts with the voters’ right to know in a democracy is that the laws set up in many democracies do not allow journalists to do their job and restricts them from being watchdogs. Belsey and Chadwick (1998, p. 6) note that the media in Britain are heavily restricted by criminal laws of official secrets, obscenity, blasphemy, and sedition. They are also restricted on reporting on things like Irish terrorist groups and their alleged supporters by the civil laws of libel and the breach of confidence. They also mention the judge-made law of contempt of court. Belsey and Chadwick (1998, p. 6) also mention that apart from just these laws that restrict and suffocate Journalism there is a general attitude and culture in the judiciary to be unsympathetic to the idea of a free press and the democratic principle of freedom of information, and are quite committed to trying to gag the media using prior restraints of interlocutory injunctions. This is a legal move virtually impossible in the United States. This sort of environment makes it hard for journalists to ascertain what is ethical and what is unethical and often this phenomenon is used as an instrument to make the powerful more powerful and the weak, weaker. As Belsey and Chadwick (1998, p. 9) points out the journalist’s conflict with honesty, noting that a journalist must certainly be honest in their activities whether it be reporting or investigating, but sometimes it is essential that the journalist go undercover, especially when it comes to something like public corruption which can only be investigated under cover with the journalist pretending to be someone else making a corrupt deal. The same applies when there is a war and the journalist discovers something that could potentially harm the war effort. Another aspect where an ethical conflict arises that Belsey and Chadwick (1998, p. 9) point out to is privacy, a journalist may genuinely have the highest regard for an individual’s right to privacy and yet claim that certain information about a politician does not merit this right. Yet another aspect Belsey and Chadwick (1998, p. 9) talk about is the broadcasting ban on terrorism posing the questions, “Even if some aspects of the ban can be defended, is it fair or in the interests of democracy to extend it to archive material of genuine historical and political interest? Or is it reasonable to prevent the broadcasting of the actual speaking voice of an alleged terrorist supporter while allowing him or her to be shown on film with an actor reading synchronised words? It is not difficult to think that wherever the line should be drawn it should not be drawn here. But the general problem remains, both in this and many other cases. Moreover, however much effort is put into drawing clear lines in a code of conduct, it is the individual journalist who will come face to face with very difficult dilemmas, and have to make moral choices. No code can anticipate every situation.” Another prominent way in which a voter’s right to information is being heavily compromised in the present mechanics of Journalism is in regard to time and deadlines given to journalists. The way the time factor has manifested itself in the present system is critical. Journalists today are faced with harsher deadlines than ever before with little time to get a story. Shoemaker and Reese (1996, p. 262) informs us that as journalists are racing against time they begin to favour readily available sources like corporations. This would lead to a culture of favouring certain types of sources over a period of time. Davies (2008, p. 69) sheds light on this explaining that these days the sole imperative for journalists is not getting an accurate insight into a story but rather to file their stories in as immediately as they possibly can simply because the present situation demands that. Therefore they spend very little time on a story and much more little or no time on checking the accuracy of the information or the legitimacy of the source, and it is in exactly this kind of situation that rapid repackaging takes place. Davies (2008, p. 64) reiterates that ascertaining the truth is one of the primary functions of Journalism arguing that the object of Journalism itself is truth and central to this objective is the responsibility of checking and therefore by taking time away we are indeed taking truth away as well. Shoemaker and Reese (1996, pp. 268-269) notes that sources with political and economic power have tremendous potential to influence news in a system where journalists bank on readily available sources. These sources usually hire regular staff for the sole purpose of getting information to the media quickly. Thus the media is dominated by these ‘official’ sources that influence and involve themselves in issues rather than events. Journalists are expected to provide the same amount of news day in and day out even if it is a slow news day this creates an increasing dependence on public relations practitioners and journalists get conditioned and revert to accepting their news rather than come up with enterprising stories. This has a dire effect on democracy as it is not only undemocratic that the economic and political elite dictate the news and views in the media but more dangerously the weak has no voice and may begin to feel that their views are socially unacceptable. News, issues and events that are in line with media routines have a much greater chance of being covered than those that are not in line with such routines. Therefore the reality is that news that is not in the reporters beat, or events and issues where there is no good footage available will go unreported (Shoemaker and Reese 1996, p. 265). Thus the principle of equality that is so essential for democracy is missing. On the contrary it has the potential to develop into a system that accommodates tyranny of a certain sect of society. The effect of this on democracy would be devastating. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) examines the extent to which minorities are underrepresented not only in the media but also in a democracy, concluding that the more a minority has acclimated itself or an individual from a minority has acculturated himself/herself to the ways of the majority, the better his/her prospects and socio-economic level is. An example they illustrate to give us an insight is the fact that there are more television characters with high status jobs than there are with low status jobs. They also note that in an elite medium there are less or no workers similar to its general population, concluding that the more the media criticizes the government, the more the government tries to control the media (Shoemaker and Reese 1996).

Thus for democracy to function it is essential that its fourth estate the press and more importantly a free press serves the purpose it is meant to serve. It is for this reason that laws cannot have bearing on it rather vice versa, it must be able to provide a reasonable inventory as to whether the law of the land is being implemented in the spirit it was written in. Belsey and Chadwick (1998, p. 6) mention that the need for media freedom has been recognised in various conventions and charters of the human rights and also in the First Amendment to the constitution of the United states of America. Belsey and Chadwick (1998, pp. 8-9) explains that unlike other professionals like health-care professionals, who due to malpractice can cause a lot more serious harm, journalists’ invading privacy is not as harmful, although there are exceptions. But given the nature of Journalism, journalists cannot be penalised for malpractice. More importantly given that laws often conflict with ethics and journalists trying to do their job and the fact that the press is such a vital part of a democratic society, journalists can do without having to be fearful of repercussions. Belsey and Chadwick (1998, p. 9) exclaim that the idea that a journalist must have a license to practice journalism and be faced with the possibility that his/her licence will be removed for violating a code of conduct is most definitely too draconian. More importantly it is an anti-democratic solution to the problem of media malpractice and would enable democracy being undermined even more than it would have been by the malpractice.

Given that it is anti-democratic to have laws that restrict and bind the ‘free press’, especially at the level it exists at present and given that in the dynamics and mechanics of a democracy it is essential to have a free press, there can only be one solution. It is the journalists who need to be ethical. Belsey and Chadwick (1998, p. 5) points out that the issue of quality is still inescapable. Quality journalism that does not rob the public of their right to knowledge, facilitating political discussion is as important to democracy as a press that is not bound by the law of the land. “A free and vigorous press and other organs of mass media and mass communications are agreed to be among the essential ingredients of a healthy democracy. (We include the word ‘vigorous’ because it is clear that freedom is not sufficient: a press could be free yet timid or torpid.)” (Belsey and Chadwick 1998, p. 6). They also debate whether the law can act as a mechanism of quality control or whether it should be the ethical code or the moral responsibility of journalists, concluding that regardless of the law having control over the press or not Journalists are still required to be ethical. They point out that in the present system with the law restricting the press the media are still capable of offending without straying beyond the law in ways like inaccuracy, lies, distortions, bias, propaganda, favouritism, sensationalism, trivialisation, lapses of taste, vulgarity, sleaze, sexism, racism, homophobia, personal attacks, smears, character assassination, cheque-book journalism, deception, betrayal of confidences and invasions of privacy. They further acknowledge that in the United States where the law is less restrictive, ethical debate between both the practitioners of Journalism and theoreticians is widespread, lively and widely accepted as the norm (Belsey and Chadwick 1998, pp. 6-8). Frost (2000, pp. 28-29) draws the contrast between France and Sweden pointing out that “in France, the law covers a wide range of issues that are dealt with by other countries in their press codes of ethical conduct. It is no surprise therefore that France, with its tough constitution and laws, has a limited code of journalistic conduct whilst Sweden, which has practically no legislation in the area of ethical media activity, has a strong code and regulatory media council that is taken very seriously by practitioners.” Thus imposing laws on the media makes the media less ethical whereas the lesser laws are imposed on the media the stronger code of ethics is followed and given that it is in a democracies interest to have a free press it is definitely the only way. The media is then governed by its code that enables it to stand up against the powerful and stand up for the weak, rather than being dictated to, and used as an instrument by the political and economic elite.

In truth any government or regime that does not allow the press to operate freely cannot be called a democracy. As Frost (2000, p. 25) rightly points out that any political system that does not allow the participation of all its citizens or for that matter a political system that does not require the participation of all its citizens through the ballot box would not require a free media. A free media in such a system would potentially be a voice of dissent that is likely to cause disruption in the society more than anything else, as it is unlikely that it would be of any use to the citizens themselves unless they are seeking to introduce democracy by trying to change the government. In this sense it is not accurate to call a government that does not allow a free press to facilitate participation from all citizens a democracy. Left only to the participation of the political and economic elite it will only make the rich, richer and the powerful, more powerful and this will happen at the expense of the poor and the weak that would continue to plummet into an even direr situation. This is most definitely contrary to the principles of democracy. Davies (2008, p. 73) points out that in the present circumstance news produced can be reliable and effective to its readers only if the outside providers of news are giving an effective and reliable account. The consequences will change the nature of Journalism itself and have considerable impact on what democracy will be described as. As far as the question as to whether Journalism should be a trade or a crusade and should journalists have a moral responsibility to take a stand for the weak and oppressed against the powerful, it is evident that if they do not do so we have to redefine what democracy is and democracy would cease to mean and be what it has been.

REFERENCE LIST

Bell, M (1995), In Harm’s Way, Hamish Hamilton, London.

Belsey, A & Chadwick, R (1998), Ethical Issues In Journalism And The Media, Routledge, London.

Bernstein, C & Woodward, B (1974), All The President’s Men, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, New York.

Curran, J & Gurevitch, M (1996), Mass Media and Society, Arnold, London.

Davies, N (2008), Flat Earth News: An Award-winning Reporter Exposes Falsehood, Distortion and Propaganda, Chatto & Windus, London.

Frost, C (2000), Media Ethics And Self-Regulation, Longman, London.

McNair, B (1998), The sociology of Journalism, Arnold, London.

Palast, G (2003), The Best Democracy Money Can Buy, Robinson, London.

Shoemaker, P & Reese, S (1996), Mediating the Message: Theories of Influence on

Mass Media Content, Longman, New York.

Spark, D (2003), Investigative Reporting, Focal Press, Oxford.

Sunstein, C (2001), ‘Exposure To Other View Points is Vital to Democracy’, The Chronicle of Higher Education, Viewed 27 October 2008, .

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the use of military deception through the media?

Sun Tzu wrote in a Chinese military treatise The Art Of War, “All warfare is deception. There is no place where espionage is not used. Offer the enemy bait to lure him.” A book that influenced Napoleon, Operation desert storm, Mao Zedong, General Vo Nguyen Giap, Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini and General Douglas McArthur (Tzu., Griffith, [translator], 1971). Handel (1982, p. 122) in his chapter ‘Intelligence and Deception’ explains that it is necessary and essential to consider deception as a rational in war as it multiplies the strength of the deceiver. Therefore while it may be popular notion to view military deception as unethical, immoral and maybe even cowardly, military deception in truth is a very legitimate and important part of war (Smith 1991, p. 70). Handel (1982, p. 122) in fact points out that while in civilian affairs deception and its forms like fraud or cheating are punishable by law or informally punishable by sanctions (including losing reputation and credibility), this is however not the case in war. This is true in international politics as well in a lesser degree, with each state having their own norms and morality. Handel (1982, p. 122) argues that in international politics and more frequently in war, deception is rewarded by greater success and achievements. Daniel and Herbig (1982, p. 155) defines deception as “the deliberate misinterpretation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage.” They note that this phenomenon of military deception is one of tactics and strategy that is extensively used, yet is seldom ever acknowledged, and if ever acknowledged it is done so only long after the conflict has ended. They point out that it is only in the last few years that America and Britain have declassified their files on their World War II deception activities. But this attitude is largely due to the nature of deception and the way it works rather than that of conscience arising from “unethical” means. As Daniel and Herbig (1982, p. 155) points out that the nature of deception is such that it does involve the keeping of secrets and thereby negating access to and withholding information. This cannot take away anything from deception being an age old and legitimate aspect of war. This essay however will deal with using the media as an instrument of military deception and the consequences it might produce.

First it would serve well to look at some essential facets of deception. A good place to start would be to look at the ways in which deception can be used in war. Handel (1982, pp. 124-128) describes vividly the different ways through which deception is employed by militaries. Handel (1992, p. 124) talks about violating the principle of concentration of forces wherein the deception campaign is set up such that it aims to mislead the enemy’s attention making him focus his forces in the wrong place. The most famous example of this is the allied deception plans which diverted the focus of the Germans on to Norway and Pas de Calais as prospective landings for the invasion and succeeded in getting their attention away from Normandy (Handel 1982, p. 125). Another similar type of deception is violating the principle of economy of force, which involves enticing the opponent to waste its resources like weapons, man power, ammunition, time etc on non-existent targets or in unimportant directions. The British employed this strategy in the battle of Britain against the Germans causing them to attack non-existent airfields and factories by interfering with the German electronic navigation aids and setting up phoney targets. Another type of deception is to surprise the opponent, creating a situation that would catch them off-guard. This is usually done by cultivating political and economic relations first, like Hitler’s ploys with Russia until the eve of Barbarossa in June 1941 (Handel 1982, p. 125). Conditioning the opponent also is a ploy to gain the surprise element like the jammed the British radar stations, enabling the German battle cruisers to break out of the English Channel, the German radar officers increased the intensity of the jamming slowly till the British radar was useless. Disguising preparations as military manoeuvres was a ploy used by the Soviet in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Handel 1982, p. 126). These types of deception campaigns are quite complex and can be devastating to the opponent, now add the new factor in the equation, the media with its potential for communication. This magnifies the potential of these deception campaigns and ways in which it can be disguised.

In researching for this topic I found very little literature on it, but the media is an integral part of the military’s apparatus for information warfare, public diplomacy and thereby even in deception strategies. Although the last one is much less acknowledged by either the press or the military, it is undeniable that the press has been at the very least an instrument in this military apparatus. Furthermore deception strategies through the media are extremely subtle and merge at a deep level. This is due to the nature of, deception and camouflage, and the nature of the way the media works, making it highly effective. Paletz (1994, p. 282) in is chapter ‘Just Deserts?’ points out that “The Gulf War revealed technology’s potential for inaccuracy and exploitation, inherent in instantaneous transmission of events without editing, contextualizing, or framing by reporters. Televised briefings were a particular concern. The military briefers were able to bypass reporters and communicate their point of view directly to the public.” O’Heffernan (1994, p. 234) in his chapter ‘A Mutual Exploitation Model of Media Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy’ further illustrates that the military briefings of the military for the press were a great hit with the audience pointing out that all around the world audiences were caught up by images of modern technological war happening live, to such an extent that their daily routines - when they slept, ate and worked - was centred around “watching the war”. The Media O’Heffernan (1994, p. 234) says not only provided vital information but also great entertainment and often the line between the two disappeared. Therefore looking at what Paletz expresses in relation to O’Heffernan we can see that the media had developed a system which the military did manage to manipulate, as a matter of fact O’Heffernan (1994, p. 234) concludes that “As long as the information supported government policy and was useful to its action, and as long as the entertainment drew audiences that could be sold to advertisers, both parties benefited.” The media was definitely being used as an instrument in the military apparatus and this did include military deception as O’Heffernan (1994, p. 234) expresses that the media organisations in the gulf war protested not only against censorship and intimidation but also against the outright disinformation from the coalition briefer. Smith (1991, p. 136) writes that the media did feel damaged and misled. The press felt like they had been misused. But looking at the bigger picture O’Heffernan (1994, p. 235) concludes that the media and the government were in a two way relationship and it was not only the government that was using the media but also the media exploiting the government in what he called “Mutual exploitation”. O’Heffernan (1994, p. 235) writes “ A team from Georgia Tech initiated a series of interviews of senior foreign policy and defence officials during the Gulf War, probing their responses to the coverage, their consumption of media, and their internal paradigm of the media-government relationship and of the impact of media on their paradigm of national security. This followed an earlier set of interviews with Journalists and officials in the United States and the former Soviet Union probing the same questions in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations.

When data from both sets of studies were examined together, the mutual exploitation theme quickly emerged. Both sets of actors acknowledged attempting to use, or using, the other. Both sets of actors could readily detail incidents in which media and government exploited each other with policy impacts, and both sets of actors described their perception of the relationships as one of both sides using each other for their own benefit. The questions asked focused on the following points:

· Did the Gulf War coverage change policy makers’ perception of the use of the media in the policy process?

· Did the Gulf War coverage change their perception of the media’s impact on public opinion and the decisions of other nation’s governments?

· Did the Gulf War coverage affect how policy-makers used the media?”

This seemingly shocking fact does raise important questions about the Press, the Government and Democracy. The Press is supposed to be the Fourth Estate of Democracy, acting as a watchdog. It may seem that the dynamics and the mechanics on how a democracy functions might be heavily upset if this basic principle is taken out of the equation. The questions that dominated the debates throughout the Gulf War in context to the media-government relationship were if the role of the media is one of a neutral observer or should it support the government in their military endeavours. Should the media try and influence the government on foreign policy matters or is that a realm the media should stay out of. But more importantly is the media being controlled or even influenced by the government, and should this be allowed during conflict (O’Heffernan 1994, p. 235). O’Heffernan (1994, p. 234) asks a thought provoking question “If both the media and the government benefited from the war’s coverage – that is, were able to exploit each other – why the controversy?” It is this same principle that may be applied in a broader context that may provide an explanation as to whether the government should be allowed to control the press during conflict. Willcox (2005, p. 39) speaks about western military leaders being at a disadvantage because of the free and independent British press as opposed to their counterparts of despotic regimes state controlled-media. Willcox explains that this provides a sort of a paradox for western propagandists propagating the values and benefits of democracy and freedom. This phenomenon has always been an issue. During the Second World War the British public and their government had to face a revaluation of their own moral standards. The military as well as the public were in a quandary, faced with a situation of having to give up their traditional gentlemanly concepts inherent to British national character in order to safeguard democracy a situation that is self-contradictory. Similar kinds of challenges were faced by General De la Billiere giving the British military no other choice but to adopt a Draconian attitude towards the press. Thus an open and democratic society is at a disadvantage with a democratic media during war (Willcox 2005, p. 39). Consequently it can be argued that in a war, the dynamics and mechanics of democracy are different, shedding some light on that question of whether the government should be allowed to control the press during conflict. Smith (1991, p. 70) reiterates that while it is unethical and wrong to deceive the media during peacetime during wartime however, withholding information so as to deceive and enemy is quite different. Therefore while it may not seem democratic that the government control the press, just as does not seem democratic that the media is shirking its watchdog function and rather being “exploited” willingly, and furthermore not acknowledging to the public that it is an instrument of military deception, just like the military does not acknowledge that it uses the media for military deception, in truth it is a system that counters the disadvantage faced by a democratic society from a democratic press. Thus one wonders if two wrongs make a right, negating each other as this phenomenon may not seem democratic in spirit it certainly is in truth. Acknowledging this truth and more importantly allowing it not only counters the disadvantage but additionally provides for an advantage to the military. The military can now use this system as camouflage for deception, as it is likely that the opponent may have access to the coverage as well. A ploy that has been used by NATO forces lately. This is highly advantageous as the trust of the existing system and media is used as camouflage, the opponent is highly unlikely to doubt that the military would risk lying to the people they are defending only for a small chance of deceiving the enemy. Taylor (1998, p. 135) refers to this while talking about Schwarzkopf’s strategies in the Gulf War, quoting Schwarzkopf:

“We knew that we were going to establish air superiority immediately so, on 17 January, whoosh, it started. I mean because we needed all of that time.... So the day we launched the offensive campaign, that was the day we started moving west.” (Schwarzkopf, cited in Taylor, 1998, p. 135).

Taylor (1998, p. 135) points out that the General’s reference to moving west was suggesting that he was planning to attack from the Saudi-Kuwait border moving left into southern Iraq, so as to deceive the enemy. Smith (1991, p. 70) mentions that Schwarzkopf had to deceive the enemy by deceiving a large number of Journalists from various nations. Smith also goes on to say that while the ground campaign was initiated Schwarzkopf enforced a news embargo on the media, as it was clear Saddam Hussein and his top military officers had been watching CNN as well as other media sources. Thus the media was providing direct inputs into the enemy camp through CNN, BBC and other media sources (Smith 1991, p. 70).

If we are to make a realistic justification of military deception and its advantages and disadvantages it is necessary to look at other overt reasons that deception is used. One of the reasons that deception is used is because an opposition is stronger. Handel (1982, pp. 122-124) explains that in order to compensate for numerical or other inferiority a side may use deception and the element of surprise to try and equal the deficit. Therefore the weaker or more at a disadvantage, a side is the more incentive they have to resort to deception. In recent times although the allied forces have not been at a disadvantage numerically or in terms of technology and warfare, they have been times where they have been in disadvantageous positions on account of its democratic press, which could have been incentive to adopt deceptive means as discussed earlier. But there are other reasons as well. Handel (1982, p. 122) points out that deception amplifies the available strength of a state enabling it use its force more economically, by achieving its aims more quickly at a lower cost. In recent times though there has been no real evidence to indicate that this has been a motive for deception. Another factor that Handel (1982, p. 122) cites as a motivation for deception is fewer casualties. This has been a factor that has motivated deception campaigns in recent times. Smith (1991, p. 71) points out that the primary reason an amphibious operation was not conducted by Schwarzkopf was to save lives. Schwarzkopf avoided what would have become a bloody fight across the ocean beach though the advantages surprise were part of his calculations, Smith argues that the primary reason was to save lives. As a matter of fact fewer casualties were a major factor in most of Schwarzkopf’s planning in the Gulf War. Taylor (1998, p. 134) points out that the memories of returning with body bags from South East Asia, a war that Schwarzkopf was a part of, created fears about heavy troop casualties in the Gulf War. This prompted American military planners to allow as much preparatory destruction of enemy positions as possible by the Air force. Taylor (1998, p. 135) provides us with the insight that Schwarzkopf occasionally worried about keeping his promise to the American people which was to try and achieve the absolute minimum number of casualties from the allied forces. Schwarzkopf claimed that minimum casualties were his objective all along. An objective he achieved. Thereby it may be justified that military deception, even through the media is advantageous.

Although it is an essential advantageous activity when done right, Handel (1982, p. 122) points out that there have been many times when deception has failed, or failed in achieving its intended objectives. There have also been occasion when deception has been counterproductive. Whaley (1982, p. 190) in his chapter ‘Toward a General Theory of Deception’ speaks about counter-deception arguing that in theory counter-deception, like deception is possible always and in every case. Whaley concludes by saying that counter deception – the detection of deception – is successfully done by masters of deception, proving themselves to be the best detectors of deception. Therefore it must be noted that deception and especially deception through the media is a highly skilful task, and one that always involves taking a gamble, with a lot at stake. Furthermore the attitude of hiding from or deceiving the media makes the public increasingly vulnerable to speculations, which may end up benefiting enemy propaganda that is not necessarily true. Taylor (2006, p. 64) in his chapter ‘Journalism under Fire: The Reporting of War and International Crisis’ sheds light on the Anglo-American policy to never discuss military events especially those involving special forces, thereby keeping out of the media long after their deployment ended, which was the reason there was only patchy coverage of the war against the Al-Quaeda movement in Afghanistan. This attitude and policy does make it much harder to counter enemy propaganda as the nature of such propaganda may be designed to answer such question that this policy does not allow, thereby misleading the public to be true. Thus deception through media can also be highly disadvantageous if these factors are not taken care of skilfully.

In conclusion it may be said that deception is a legitimate and essential aspect of war, and deception through the media by a democratic free press may be argued to be as essential a factor to war as deception is. Furthermore deception through the media is justified by the reasons it is employed namely to overcome situations where you are at a disadvantage or weaker, to make it quicker and at a lower cost, and most importantly to avoid casualties, or for fewer casualties. While deception through the media does bring about the above mentioned advantages, it must be remembered that is also has the potential to be highly disadvantages.

REFERENCE LIST

Atkinson, R (1993), Crusade, The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York.

Paletz, D & Bennett, L (1994), Taken by Storm, The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, The University of Chicago Press, London.

Brown, B & Shukman, D (1991), All Necessary Means, BBC Books, London.

Cottle, S (2006), News, Public Relations and Power, Sage, London.

Freedman, L & Karsh, E (1994), The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991, Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, Faber and Faber, London.

Gooch, J & Perlmutter, A (1982), Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, Frank Cass, London.

Hiro, D (2003), Desert Shield to Desert Storm, Authors Choice Press, New York.

Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (1996), viewed 18 March 2009, http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/c4i/jp3_13_1.pdf

Macarthur, J (2004), Second Front, Censorship and Propaganda in the 1991 Gulf War, University of California Press, London.

Mendelson, J (1988), Covert Warfare: Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, Garland Publishing, London.

Mendelson, J (1988), Covert Warfare: Cover and Deception by the Royal Air Force in World War II, Garland Publishing, London.

Morrison, D (1992), Television and the Gulf War, John Libbey, London.

Safty, A (1992), From Camp David to the Gulf, Black Rose Books, New York.

Simpson, J (1991), From the House of War, Hutchinson, London.

Smith, H (1992), The Media and the Gulf War: The Press and Democracy in Wartime, Seven Locks Press, Washington D.C.

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